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TOWARD CONTROLLED CLINICAL CARE THROUGH
CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: THE LEGAL
LIABILITY FOR DEVELOPERS AND ISSUERS OF
CLINICAL PATHWAYS
INTRODUCTION
National health care reform continues to dominate the
domestic political, social and economic scenes. The health care
system in the United States is plagued by escalating costs and
excess capacity, resulting in a fundamental shift in the way
health care is administered, organized and funded.1 In 1995,
close to 150 million Americans received their health care
through health maintenance organizations and other managed
care entities, which is an increase of more than thirty percent
from the ninety-two million enrollees in 1992.2 The issues
figuring most prominently in this reform are cost-containment,
cost-effectiveness and quality treatment.3 Reconciling these
competing interests, quality of care versus cost-containment
and effectiveness, is the major challenge facing the health care
system.
As a result of these competing concerns, the health care
industry has gravitated toward the use and development of
clinical outcomes or clinical guidelines, generally called clinical
practice guidelines ("CPG-s").4 Clinical practice guidelines were
' See generally Rex O'Neal, Safe Harbor For Health Care Cost Containment,
43 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1991); Richard C. Reuben, In Pursuit of Health, A.BA J.,
Oct. 1996, at 55 (according to the United States Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, health care expenditures accounted for almost 14,75 of the nation's
gross domestic product in 1994).
2 Reuben, supra note 1, at 55.
See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Ouersight of the Quality of Medical
Care: Regulation, Management or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825 (1995); see
also HEALTH SECURITY AC, H.R. 3960, 103rd Cong. (1994).
" "Clinical Practice Guidelines" have various synonyms including- "clinical path-
ways," "critical pathways," "clinical paradigms," 'practice parameters," "clinical
algorithms," "treatment protocols," and "standards." The various terms are often
interchangeable; however, the American Medical Association prefers the use of the
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originally intended to aid in the standardization of certain
aspects of health care practice.' CPGs were deemed necessary
after researchers discovered that there were wide variations in
the ways in which physicians treat the same illnesses, result-
ing in inconsistent, and often, ineffective and expensive treat-
ments.' Moreover, studies revealed that many physicians were
using methods of diagnosis and treatment that had very weak
scientific support.7 As a result of these findings, the guidelines
have been accorded wide acceptance due to the belief that they
will "improve the quality of patient care, improve patient treat-
ment outcomes, reduce costs and generally ii,,prove patient
satisfaction."8
term "parameters," compared to "guidelines" or "standards," because the latter
terms appear to invite strict adherence whereas the former suggests flexibility in
application, allowing room for independent physician discretion and judgment. See
Edward Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of Care in Mal.
practice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886 (1991).
The distinctions between the terms used to describe "clinical practice guide-
lines," although seemingly subtle, should not be considered irrelevant. As discussed
infra, there is concern over including the word "standard" when referring to CPGs
because of the law's use of the word "standard" to refer to the legal duty of care.
See David M. Eddy, Designing A Practice Policy: Standards, Guidelines and Op-
tions, 262 JAMA 3077 (1990). This differentiation is likely to be critical when
practice guidelines are admitted into court in medical malpractice actions as evi-
dence of the legal standard of care required of practitioners. The most important
legal inquiry in these circumstances is likely to be whether the language of the
guideline appears to specify mandatory or permissive actions by providers. "The
concern is that a label such as 'standard' or 'rule' will be interpreted by the
health care and legal communities as signaling a mandatory level of clinical care."
See THE 1995 MEDICAL OUTCOMES AND GUIDELINES SOURCEBOOK 414 (Spencer
Vibbert et al., eds., Faulkner & Gray 1995) [hereinafter MEDICAL OUTCOMES].
' See John D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J.
LEGAL MED. 421 (1994). Although practice guidelines have been used in the medi-
cal profession since 1930, it was not until 1980, when faced with rising costs of
health care and the perception that much of the increased cost was due to inap-
propriate clinical practices, that the pace of development began to escalate. Ex-
perts suggested that guidelines might help physicians reduce practice variation and
subsequently enhance the quality of patient care. See generally Steven H. Woolf,
Practice Guidelines: What the Family Physician Should Know, 51 AMERICAN FAM,
PHYSICIAN 1455 (1995).
' See Mark R. Chassin, et al, Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical
Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285 (1986) (research-
ers demonstrated with overwhelming evidence that physicians' methods and prac-
tices of treating various similar conditions and illnesses vary widely for no appar-
ent reason).
" See David M. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical, Practice,
307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 343 (1982).
S Mark Kadzielski et al., Peer Review and Practice Guidelines Under Health
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By making readily accessible the clinical knowledge
gleaned from "outcomes research,"9 CPGs are intended to
"point the way toward higher quality and more cost-effective
care."' ° Thus, the premise behind the use and development of
such guidelines is that cost-effective quality health care can be
provided if variation in health care is reduced.'
Although there is general agreement among physicians
that the development of CPGs is likely to increase the quality
of care by making more accessible the clinical knowledge
obtained from outcomes research, the guidelines are a relative-
" ly new concept. Thus, continued controversy is provoked con-
cerning certain crucial aspects of the use of the guidelines.
First, many physicians, organizations and health care experts
agree that greater attention is needed as regarding the pro-
cesses by which guidelines are developed and disseminated.
With a growing number of organizations developing various
guidelines, questions arise as to: 1) the standards used to de-
velop the guidelines; 2) the amount and type of research uti-
lized in their development; 3) the frequency of reevaluation of
guidelines in light of medical advances; and 4) the issue of
choice when physicians are confronted with conflicting guide-
lines which are issued by different organizations.'2
A second problem, which is the focus of this Note, involves
the potential liability of developers and issuers of CPGs. As
CPGs become more widely used and more widely sought by
Care Reform, 16 WHrTrER L. REV. 157 (1995).
' Outcomes research is the study and analysis of the outcomes of various
treatments administered to certain patient populations. A CPG will be more reli-
able and credible if the information used to develop the guideline was the result
of reviewing all relevant medical literature and patient outcomes information.
See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
"0 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care
Reform, 5 HEALTH MATTRIX 369 (1995).
"' See generally William Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative
to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1179 (1990);
Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 QUAL. REV.
BuLL. 42 (1990); Clark C. Havighurst Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The
Policy Rationale, 34 ST. Louis U. L. REV. 777 (1990).
Guidelines are currently being developed and issued by the federal govern-
ment, physician organizations, medical specialty societies, managed care plans,
insurers, hospitals, employers, quality assurance firms, state governments and
private vendors. Woolf, supra note 5, at 1456. With hundreds of groups developing
thousands of guidelines, it is easy to imagine a situation in which guidelines may
conflict with respect to treating a particular illness.
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physicians, hospitals, health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") and other groups, it is becoming apparent that their
development, in and of itself, is a thriving business. Managed
care organizations are utilizing all available cost-containment
measures in an attempt to reduce the escalating health care
costs. As developers begin to reap significant financial benefits
from the development of CPGs, there is an increasing pressure
to hold responsible and accountable those who gain financially
from an activity that centers on the general public health.1" A
related concern is that guideline development will be viewed
by a majority of managed care organizations solely as a means
to contain costs, overshadowing the equally important goal of
increasing the quality of health care. Because there is very
little case law regarding the use of clinical pathway guidelines,
the health care industry-including physicians, hospitals, and
health maintenance organizations-faces legal uncertainty
when considering whether the development and use of practice
guidelines will heighten or reduce their liability exposure to
medical malpractice claims. 4 This uncertainty is likely to af-
fect the development and use of CPGs."5
This Note argues that the development of CPGs is crucial
to the success of achieving both quality medical care and re-
duction of costs. However, because CPGs may effectively lower
the cost of medical care and treatment at the expense of pro-
viding quality medical care, it may be dangerous to allow
13 Rosoff, supra note 10, at 390.
14 A particularly sensitive subject, discussed infra, regards the development of
CPGs by HMOs and other third party payers, who, arguably, view CPGs primarily
as a cost-effective measure rather than as a way to ensure quality treatment. This
tension between containing costs and providing quality care is exacerbated whon
the HMOs or other insurers urge their physicians, many of whom believe that the
goal of CPG development should focus primarily on quality care, to abide by their
developed guidelines. Critics of HMOs argue that managed care "is more about
making money than saving it." Reuben, supra note 1, at 55. Moreover, critics
contend that HIOs offer doctors powerful inducements to be conservative in their
treatments, which could mean cutting back on hospital stays for patients or limit-
ing referrals to specialists. Doctors are often put in the undesirable position of
having to choose between potential malpractice for undertreatment, paying for
treatment themselves when they have exhausted their "fixed fee per patient" ar-
rangement, or being eliminated from an HMO's referral list for overutilization of
treatment. Obviously this situation causes resentment among physicians for what
they view as a usurpation of their medical judgment by cost-conscious, uninvolved
managed care executives. Id.
1 Rosoff, supra note 10, at 373.
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health care management organizations and other third party
payers, whose primary goal may be cost-effectiveness, to devel-
op and issue their own guidelines. This danger may be re-
duced, initially, by requiring that CPGs be accredited by a
neutral multi-disciplinary committee of health care experts,
whose primary concern is the quality of patient care. 6
Part I of this Note introduces and defines the concept of
clinical pathway guidelines and traces the rise in their devel-
opment and use. Part II discusses the possible bases for devel-
opers' and issuers' liability. Part II addresses the specific
theories of liability which may attach when managed care
organizations, such as HMOs and other managed care compa-
nies, serve as the developers and issuers of clinical guidelines.
This part focuses on the tension which arises when cost-sensi-
tive organizations are in the business of developing guidelines
for quality care. It also explains the ways in which compliance
with guidelines may not only shield physicians from medical
malpractice liability, but may also constitute substantial evi-
dence in lawsuits brought by physicians for indemnification
against health maintenance organizations and other insurers
who urged the use of the guidelines. Finally, Part IV examines
the current roles of federal and state governments in institu-
tionalizing and certifying the guidelines. This part discusses
the inadequacy of the current certification process and con-
cludes with a proposal concerning the appropriate roles of
federal and state governments regarding clinical practice
guidelines.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What Are Clinical Practice Guidelines?
Clinical practice guidelines are defined in various ways.
The Institute of Medicine defines OPGs as "systematically de-
veloped statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions
about appropriate health care from specific clinical circum-
stances."' The Medical Outcomes & Guidelines Sourcebook
6 To date, there is no requirement that CPGs be accredited. Similarly, there
are no regulations regarding their usage or development. See Kadzielsld, supra
note 8, at 161.17 INSrrTUT OF MEDICINE: CLINICAL PRAcTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A
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describes a CPG as "a descriptive tool or standardized specifi-
cation for care of the typical patient in the typical situation;
developed by a formal process that incorporates the best scien-
tific evidence of effectiveness with expert opinion. . ."11 The
American Medical Association refers to guidelines as "practice
parameters," in an effort to encourage both flexibility in their
adoption and use of a physician's clinical judgment when it
may differ from the guideline. 9 Most definitions are uniform
in their aim: to improve physician decisionmaking by detailing
appropriate indications for specific medical interventions.
The development of CPGs is complicated by the difficulty
in developing a single method of guidance for highly complex
and varied areas of medicine that is prescriptive, clear and
unambiguous." There are some clinical problems that are
well-suited to a specific and straightforward set of guidelines
that can be applied as treatment to a wide spectrum of pa-
tients.2' For example, the anesthesiologist practice guideline,
which was developed by the American Society of Anesthesi-
ologists, is considered to be a successful guideline because it is
"designed for a specific purpose, addresses a clinical problem
that can be handled in essentially the same way for a wide
spectrum of patients, and can be presented as a limited set of
rules that should be followed."22
The anesthesiology guideline focuses on avoiding patient
injuries caused by oxygen deprivation resulting from accidents
during anesthetization." The practice guideline identifies a
set of standards that anesthesiologists should follow to avoid
serious injuries which result from oxygen deprivation.' It was
developed by reviewing claims made to malpractice insurance
carriers after the occurrence of anesthetic accidents. The claim
NEW PROGRAM, Washington, D.C. (National Acad. Press 1990).
18 MEDICAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4 at 683.
" J.T. Kelly & J.C. Swartout, Development of Practice Parameters by Physician
Organizations, 1990 QUALITY REV. BULL. 16:54-57; see also MEDICAL PRACTICE
GUIDELINES, CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE WESTERN JOURNAL OF MEDI-
CiNE, Vol. 161 No. 1, at 39 (1995).
o Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2886.
2, Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2886.
Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2886.
E. Pierce, The Development of Anesthesia Guidelines and Standards, 16
QuAL. REV. BULL. 61-64 (1990).
24 Id.
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records were analyzed to determine whether there was a com-
mon pattern to the injuries that could be resolved by initiating
changes in the practices of anesthesiologists. After evaluating
the records, the researchers "discovered that a high percentage
of accidents might have been prevented by the use of certain
types of equipment designed to measure the amount of oxygen
in a patient's blood when under anesthesia and by proper
maintenance and use of other anesthesia equipment.' The
proposed reason why this guideline is so successful is that it is
"simple and prescriptive."26 Additionally, it states when equip-
ment designed to measure blood oxygen should be used and
how this equipment should be maintained. Finally, this guide-
line is successful because it applies to almost all patients who
receive general anesthesia.'
In stark contrast to the anesthesiological guideline out-
lined above is the guideline for treatment of depression, devel-
oped by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research in
April, 1994, which sets forth: "The specific medication choice is
based on side effects profiled, history of prior response, family
Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2886 (quoting E. Pierce, The Development of
Anesthesia Guidelines and Standards, 16 QUAL. REV. BULL. 61 (1990)).
2 Hirshfeld supra note 4, at 2886.
Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2886. Interestingly, the guideline is designed in
such a way that there is little room for clinical judgments to be made by the
individual treating physicians. This guideline is also fairly limited in scope in that
it does not address the medical practice of anesthesiology beyond equipment usage
and maintenance.
Contrast the anesthesiology guideline with the guideline designed to aid in
the decision of when to implant a pacemaker. The goal of the pacemaker guideline
is different from that of the anesthesiology guideline in that the objective of the
pacemaker guideline is to "reduce the provision of unnecessary medical care by
providing guidance for when it is appropriate to implant a pacemaker." Hirshfeld,
supra note 4, at 2887. Because the decision of whether and when to implant a
pacemaker is considered complex, the guideline reflects this complexity in its
structure. "The guideline divides patients into various categories, depending on the
nature and gravity of their symptoms." Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2887. There are
three distinct categories into which patients may falL patients who are considered
appropriate candidates for pacemaker implants bated on specific selected criteria,
patients who are considered inappropriate candidates based on certain selected
criteria, and patients for whom implants are agreed to be of uncertain value.
Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2887. This guideline allows for a substantial amount of
uncertainty, thus allowing treating physicians to engage in more independent clini-
cal judgments when there are patients for whom the benefits of the pacemaker
implant is uncertain. There is also uncertainty as to the category in which to
place a given patient when the patient's symptoms do not clearly fit into one of
the guideline's categories. Hirshfeld, supra note 4, at 2887.
199'7] 1347
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history of response, time of depression, and concurrently pre-
scribed medications."28 This guideline would be of little help
to a physician because it is vague, ambiguous and provides no
new information for the proper method to treat depression.29
It does not provide for a division of patients into various cate-
gories reflecting various stages of depression and makes no
mention of different medications and their effects on people at
different stages of depression. Additionally, there is discussion
about varying symptoms in the depressed patient population
and how various medications may impact different symptoms.
This type of guideline, which lacks specificity and direction,
has no positive effect on treatment of the disorder; nor does it
tend to reduce the cost of treatment, since no treatment is
specified. Thus, it fulfills neither the goal of quality health care
nor the goal of cost-effectiveness. Developers should, therefore,
whenever possible, focus on writing guidelines which are clear,
prescriptive and specific.
B. Who Develops Guidelines and How?
The number of organizations responsible for developing
clinical pathway guidelines has increased substantially over
the past eight years. In 1990, there were twenty-six physician
organizations responsible for creating more than 700 guide-
lines. 0 By 1994, it was estimated that over sixty organiza-
tions were responsible for creating more than 1,600 such
guidelines.31 This presents the scenario that practice guide-
lines are being developed by an increasingly wider range of
groups and individuals, including physicians, hospital execu-
tive officers and trustees, private research organizations and
third party payers.32 Additionally, the federal government is
becoming more involved in developing guidelines. The Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research ("AHCPR"), through the
Office of the Forum for Quality and Effectiveness, is responsi-
28 See Kadzielski, supra note 8, at 163.
2' Kadzielski, supra note 8, at 163.
Medical Malpractice Guidelines, wESTERN J. MED., July 1994, at 39.
31 Ayers, supra note 5, at 421.
32 See Karen A. Butler, R.N., Health Care Quality Revolution: Legal Landmines
For Hospitals And The Rise Of The Critical Pathway, 58 ALB. L. REV. 843, 850
(citing JCAHO, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS at ix (1992)).
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ble for developing practice guidelines for high-cost procedures
and for procedures in which significant variation in the man-
ner of performance has been found across the country.s
The most effective practice guidelines are those that are
developed through the use of outcomes research, which is re-
search that is conducted on various methods of treatment and
' The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-239, added
Title IX to the Public Health Service Act, which established the Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research to 'enhance the quality, appropriateness, and effective-
ness of health care services, and access to such services. See Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 6103, 103 Stat. 2189 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 1993)). The
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research Re-authorization Act of 1992, Pub. L.
102-410, enacted on October 13, 1992, extended the authorization of the AHCPR
and amended certain provisions related to the development of clinical practice
guidelines.
The AHCPR, through the Office of the Forum for Quality and Effectiveness in
Health Care, arranges for the development, periodic review and updating of clini-
cally relevant guidelines that may be used by physicians, other health care practi-
tioners, educators, and consumers. The guidelines assist in determining how dis-
eases, disorders, and other health conditions can most effectively and appropriately
be prevented, diagnosed, treated and clinically managed. The AHCPR also supports
development, periodic review, and updating of medical review criteria, standards of
quality, and performance measures, based on the guidelines. From 1992 through
May 1994, the AHCPR has released ten clinical practice guidelines in the follow-
ing areas: Acute Pain Management, Urinary Incontinence, Pressure Ulcers, Cata-
ract Ulcers, Depression in Primary Care, Sickle Cell Disease, Evaluation and Man-
agement of Early HIV Infection, Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia, Management of
Cancer Pain and Unstable Angina. Ten more guidelines are under developmenL
MEDICAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at 171.
Arnold J. Rosoff suggests that the AHCPRs work, in many respects, 'is
more focused on expanding knowledge than on applying it,' and states that much
of their activity involves studying, developing and revising. Rosoff, supra note 10,
at 373.
One issue, discussed infra, is whether the AHCPR should be responsible for
being the sole official developer of clinical pathway guidelines, thereby providing
credibility and consistency to an often confusing and scattered array of guidelines.
The AHCPR-commissioned guidelines differ from other guidelines in that- 1) they
are created by private-sector, multi-disciplinary panels of experts, including con-
sumer representatives; 2) they are based on extensive literature reviews and re-
flect the best science available; 3) they are subjected to intensive scrutiny by peer
reviewers and on-site clinical evaluations by potential users to assess validity,
efficacy and applicability, 4) they are written for health care providers and con-
sumers; 5) they include analysis of the use and cost of health care resources and
assessment of the feasibility of implementation; and 6) they are updated to incor-
porate new information. MEDICAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at 168. Notably, Sec-
tion 914(a) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-3(a), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 102-410, identifies factors to be considered in establishing priorities for
guideline topics and goals which these guidelines should serve; there is no mention
of cost-effectiveness as a priority in the development of clinical guidelines. MEDI-
CAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at 17L
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the subsequent outcome in the patient populations. 3' Out-
comes research centers on two key concepts: outcomes mea-
surement and outcomes management. 5 Outcomes measure-
ment refers to the statistical evaluation of the effectiveness of
particular types of clinical intervention. The outcome of one
treatment is compared with the results of similar types of clini-
cal intervention. 6 Outcomes management refers to the ac-
tions that providers take as a result of the above evaluations.
Consequently, in the development and communication of clini-
cal pathway guidelines, "there is a continual process of mea-
suring and developing guidelines, applying the guidelines, and
then measuring, revising, and measuring again."7 Thus, out-
comes research is the basis from which clinical pathway guide-
lines are spawned, and such on-going research is critical to
maintaining the guidelines' validity. 8
Although practice guidelines have been used for over fifty
years to facilitate effective decisionmaking by physicians, 9
the rise in the number of organizations developing guidelines
and the sheer number of physicians utilizing them has indicat-
ed a general shift from "unexamined reliance on professional
judgment toward more structured support for, and accountabil-
ity of, such judgment."40 Due to the sensitivity surrounding
cost-containment and cost-effective health care reforms, there
is an increasing recognition of the roles that outcomes research
and practice guidelines may play as cost-containment factors.
Advocates of clinical guidelines argue that such guidelines
decrease physician uncertainty and lower rates of inappropri-
ate care "by codifying knowledge in particular practice ar-
Kadzielski, supra note 8, at 161-62
Lowell C. Brown & Joan Procopio, Sailing Through Uncharted Waters: Out-
comes Measurement, Practice Guidelines, and the Law, 16 WHITrIER L. REV. 1021
(1995).
'6 Id.
3Id.
"' The Forum for Quality and Effective Health Care was created under the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 with the specific mandate to preside
over panels charged with the development of practice guidelines based on outcomes
research. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 901, 103 Stat. 2189 (1989) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 299 (1994)).
" Rosoff, supra note 10, at 373.
4' Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and
Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2860 (1991).
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eas."41 Additionally, they provide information that is direct,
concise and easy to use. Advocates urge attorneys to advise
physicians that these clinical guidelines do not trump the phy-
sician's responsibility to exercise independent judgment based
on the individual patient's circumstances. Rather, physi-
cians are encouraged to view the practice guidelines as flexible,
and they are urged to continue utilizing their independent
clinical judgment--even when their judgment may conflict with
the proposed guideline.'
Proponents also argue that physician acceptance and reli-
ance on practice guidelines will reduce the number of unneces-
sary diagnostic tests performed on patients. Specifically, indus-
try pressure to adhere to CPGs will prevent physicians from
performing unnecessary and costly tests in an effort to insulate
themselves from malpractice suits.
Although there is evidence that practice guidelines are
viewed favorably by hospital executives and managed care
organizations," physicians are divided on the issue. Many
physicians argue that mandating compliance with these guide-
lines is turning health care into "cookbook medicine," with the
result that very little clinical judgment is left to the physi-
cian.' Practice guidelines also present some practical prob-
"Medical Practice Guidelines, WEsTERN J. MED., July 1994, at 39.
Brown & Procopio, supra note 35, at 1022.
See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text. The Wieline court essentially
held that a physician is responsible for exercising his clinical judgment even when
the guideline calls for a different treatment. This may not necessarily be true in
the future. It is uncertain how courts will view situations in which HMO3 and
other insurers have essentially strong-armed doctors into following their developed
guidelines, through use of financial incentives or fear of dismissal from HMO ros-
ters due to overutilization of treatments not recommended by the guideline. See
Reuben, supra note 1, at 60.
" A Survey of Leading Health Care Executives Conducted by The Bo3ton Con-
sulting Group, An Industry Perspective on Health Care Reform: Goals, Elements
and Implications, 1993.
"Brown & Procopio, supra note 35, at 1022. But see Mark A. Hall & D. Soph-
ocles Dadakis, Character of Guidelines Evolves, Concern Lingers Over Protection, 13
No. 4 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 1 (1996). This article advocates for
guideline developers to draft aguidelines" more as 'protocols," so that they will
have a greater chance of establishing a conclusive standard of care. For guidelines
to be considered in the courtroom as conclusive standards of care, developers must
draft the guidelines more specifically, so that the treatment decision doe3 not lie
wholly within the judgment of individual physicians. When guidelines are vague as
to how a physician should treat a malady, the guideline itself will offer little pro-
tection against accusations that a physician made poor decisions. Id. at 2.
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lems for physicians. For example, questions and complexities
arise when a provider contracts with numerous health mainte-
nance organizations or other third party payers, each of which
present different guidelines for the provider to observe.4"
Providers' attitudes toward CPGs have differed depending
on the organization responsible for developing the guideline,
their motive and the reliability of the information being used.
In 1992,. the most extensive survey of physician attitudes to-
ward CPGs was conducted. Although the survey is almost
six years old, the results serve to shed light on practice guide-
lines' reputation among physicians. Interestingly, one of the
key findings of the study showed there was a wide range of
confidence in guidelines, depending on the organizations in-
volved in their development. For example, eighty percent of
physicians said they were "very confident" in guidelines pre-
pared by the American College of Physicians, while only six
percent expressed similar confidence in those developed by the
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Associations.4"
These findings may indicate several things. First, physi-
cians are likely to distrust any guidelines that are developed
with cost-effectiveness as the primary goal. Physicians have
primarily viewed CPGs as a way to enhance the quality of
patient care, not as cost-cutting measures. This conflict be-
tween the goals of individual physicians and the goals of man-
aged care companies creates an uneasy tension, whereby the
physician may come to view certain CPGs very skeptically,
especially as the managed care companies more strenuously
" Brown & Procopio, supra note 35, at 1023.
'7 Because physician support is essential to the widespread adoption and use of
CPGs, a group of U.S. and Canadian researches formed the Guidelines Appraisal
Project (GAP) which was responsible for conducting the extensive study on CPGs.
In order to assess physicians' attitudes toward CPGs, the GAP disseminated a
lengthy questionnaire to 2,600 members of the American College of Physicians;
over 1,500 responses were received. Additional findings included that: 1) most phy-
sicians are not familiar with existing guidelines, with a few notable exceptions;
and 2) ambivalence characterizes physicians' attitudes toward guidelines. Al-
though close to 70% of survey respondents believe that guidelines would improve
the quality of medical care, about the same number think guidelines will be used
in disciplinary actions against clinicians. MEDICAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at 73.
For a complete review of the study's results, see Sean Tunis, M.D., Primary
Care Physicians' Attitudes Toward Clinical Practice Guidelines, CLINICAL RE-
SEARCH (1992).
48 MEDICAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at 73.
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advocate for their use.4 9 Second, physicians may believe that
guidelines promulgated by a national medical organization are
more respectable and indicative of the standard of care owed to
a patient. Third, physicians may believe that managed care
companies will force them to utilize the guideline as a require-
ment to remaining on the organization's roster of physicians,
thus exposing the physician to medical malpractice actions
based on his/her compliance with a faulty or ineffective
guideline.
Physicians are hesitant to embrace practice guidelines
because of their uncertain implications in the courtroom. Pres-
ently, guidelines have been used in the courtroom by both
plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants' attorneys, indicating a
"two-way street."0 In an analysis of twenty-eight cases where
guidelines were considered, plaintiffs' attorneys have used
them against physicians as inculpatory evidence in twenty-two
cases. Alternatively, defendants' attorneys have successfully
used them as exculpatory evidence in six of the cases."1 Al-
though evidence of compliance with or deviation from the
guidelines has been used by both parties, plaintiffs have tend-
ed to make substantially greater use of guidelines to their
advantage,52 making physicians wary as to the future impli-
cations of the use of CPGs.' If, however, CPGs are adopted as
an absolute afrmative defense to patient claims of negligence,
physicians would surely encourage their use. Guidelines, thus,
" Many people supported the guidelines movement at an earlier phase when
the focus was on enhancing the quality of patient care. These same people may be
much less inclined to support CPGs now that the focus has changed and they are
being heavily utilized by managed care companies as a way to reduce costs. See
Rosoff, supra note 10, at 373.
" See Andrew L. Hyams, et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice
Litigation An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 289, 293-96
(1996).
" Id. at 296. Used as inculpatory evidence, a practitioners failure to adhere
to the guideline supports a finding that the practitioner deviated from the re-
quired standard of care; used as exculpatory evidence, a finding that practitioner
adhered to the guideline supports a finding that he/she acted consistently with the
required standard of care.
52 Id.
"Interestingly, legislators have seen guidelines as a 'one-way street, to be
used only be physicians as an affirmative defense, proof that they adhered to the
required standard of care. This scenario is being played out in Maine with the
1990 Maine Medical Liability Demonstration Project. To date, there has been no
litigation there surrounding practice guidelines. Id. at 306.
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would likely become more reliable and effective, because they
would become more widely used, allowing for a significant
basis from which to conduct outcomes research as to their
ongoing effectiveness.
Critics of managed care companys' involvement with
guideline development note that because IMOs and other
managed care companies control the "power of the purse,"
physicians recognize that any independent decision made with-
out consent of the organization could result in termination
from the plan's roster. Realizing this, many physicians may
begin to adhere blindly to HMO regulations and guidelines,
without questioning their underlying validity. It is not unlike-
ly, then, that when faced with the prospect of being removed
from an H1VIO roster, physicians, especially those who work
solely for the HMO, would abide by the HMO's guidelines rath-
er than face unemployment. This highlights the strong criti-
cism advanced by many health care experts with respect to
CPGs: CPGs alter the physician's role of independent
decisionmaker. The result is that doctors cease to exercise
their professional judgment and, instead, adhere strictly to a
prescribed set of rules.' Not only does this negatively affect
patients, who may fall outside the guideline's prescriptions, it
may also seriously impede medical development. When physi-
cians adhere only to standardized rules and no longer experi-
ment with new and potentially revolutionary treatments, the
growth of medical development suffers.55
Although some practitioners, providers and other medical
experts continue to be skeptical of the guidelines, both as to
their implications in a court of law and their potentially chill-
ing effect on the advancement of medicine," physicians have
noted that the following features would make guidelines more
desirable: 1) greater attention to the processes by which guide-
5' See Steven H. Woolf, M.D., Practice Guidelines: A New Reality in Medicine,
153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2646, 2649 (1993).
" See J. Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice? The Effect of a
Consensus Statement on the Practice of Physicians, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED 1306
(1989); see also P.S. Appelbaum, Practice Guidelines in Psychiatry and their Impli.
cations for Malpractice, 43 HOSPITAL COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 341 (1992).
56 Ironically, many physicians also view guidelines as a way to advance tech-
nology and patient care, but only when quality of care is foremost in the develop-
ment of the guideline, not cost-effectiveness.
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lines are developed and disseminated; 2) the comprehensive
inclusion of all steps needed to be taken in a given procedure
or treatment; 3) the incorporation of all factors that should be
considered before the procedure is recommended; and 4) ease
of comprehension and application."7 Other physician research
studies identified additional desirable characteristics, including
wide dissemination, specificity, validity, clarity, clinical flexibil-
ity and applicability.58 The Institute of Medicine suggests that
guidelines should be developed by a multi-disciplinary process
that includes participation by representatives of key affected
groups.
59
It has become clear that clinical practice guidelines are not
a passing fancy. Medical specialty societies, like the American
Cancer Society, the American College of Physicians and the
Institute of Medicine, have all taken a leading role in develop-
ing guidelines."0 In addition, the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations ("JCAHO") has
asked medical specialty societies to make guideline develop-
ment a priority."' Previously, organizations could establish
proof of compliance with guidelines by proving that the mini-
mum policies and procedures had been followed.' Now, the
JCAHO requires that organizations complying with guidelines
prove that their policies and procedures produce quality re-
sults.s One rationale for this stricter standard results from
the changing and evolving use of CPGs over time. Initially,
guidelines were viewed as one of the few tools that could be
used "to control the volume and intensity of services offered to
patients without sacrificing quality."' As the use and devel-
Louise Kaegi, Foreward, 18 QUAL REV. BULL. 392 (1992).
58 MEDICAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at 415-16.
"NATIONAL ACAD. PRESS, INSTrrUTE OF MIEDICINE: CLINICAL PRACTICE
GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAMI (1990). See also A Survey of Lead-
ing Health Care Executives Conducted by The Boston Consulting Group, An Indus-
try Perspective on Health Care Reform: Goals, Elements and Implications, at 58
(1993) (finding that defining what should be measured and how accurate metrics
can be collected are critical issues needing resolution. 'Some type of federal board
to set standards combined with a method of localization appears to be a popular
approach.") For a full discussion, see supra Part IV. See also Leape, supra note
11, at 42.
60 Medical Malpractice Guidelines, WESTERN J. OF IED, July 1994, at 39.
61 Id
Brown & Procopio, supra note 35, at 1021-22.
Brown & Procopio, supra note 35, at 1021-22.
"Medical Practice Guidelines, WESTERN J. OF IED., July 1994, at 39. Of
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opment of these guidelines has grown and many more organi-
zations are involved in their proliferation, there are growing
concerns that the goal of cost-effective treatment could or may
be overshadowing the development of quality care guidelines.
Since there is no governmental regulation of the develop-
ment, issuance and usage of practice guidelines, many physi-
cians' groups, managed care companies and other organiza-
tions have become involved. Such groups had little to fear in
the way of liability because there has not been a lawsuit alleg-
ing negligence (or any other legal theory) in guideline develop-
ment. As a consequence of the many groups and individuals
involved in promulgating guidelines, there are also many
methods being used. For example, the federal legislation which
created the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research ex-
pressly granted to the body the power to appoint panels of
physician experts and consumer representatives to carefully
direct the development of CPGs. Such guidelines are to be
based "to the fullest extent possible, on the findings of treat-
ment outcomes and effectiveness research."65 Alternatively,
there are many locally developed guidelines that are being
advanced by institutional providers, like local hospitals and
other health systems. Additionally, there are individual physi-
cians and health care executives who are involved in develop-
ment. As one can imagine, the methods used by such varied
individuals and entities can vary drastically, causing inconsis-
tency and ineffectiveness.66 As will be discussed in Part IV,
course, this view that guidelines do not sacrifice quality for cost-effectiveness is
being continually challenged and is a central concern when health maintenance
organizations and managed care systems are the bodies developing the guidelines.
r5 42 U.S.C. § 299(b) (1994).
6 Kadzielski, supra note 8, at 161. Kadzielski argues that:
[T]he issue which is central to the whole debate of whether guidelines
have any utility in the courtroom [as a sword for plaintiffs or as a shield
for physicians] is that there exists good guidelines which are valid and
have potential use, as well as bad guidelines which may be equated with
'junk science.' It is important to realize that what we are dealing with
in respect to these varying quality of guidelines is like making a compar-
ison between apples and oranges. It is necessary to differentiate between
the two to determine whether guidelines have any role at all in
clinical practice and in courts of law.
Kadzielski, supra note 8, at 161 (emphasis added).
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this potential result is a strong incentive to add some type of
regulation or certification into the mixture of development and
usage.
Clinical practice guidelines will only become more en-
trenched in the United States health care system as the feder-
al government tries to provide all residents with medical cover-
age-' Health care outcomes reporting and practice guideline
development were included as important elements of federal
health reform proposals. In 1993, President Clinton proposed,
in the Health Security Act,' the creation of a National Quali-
ty Management Council to establish national measures of
quality performance. In the Health Care Reform Bill, passed
by Congress in 1996, there are numerous references to the
importance of the development and use of CPGs as one of the
most effective ways to contain costs and increase quality simul-
taneously.69 Prior to passage of this bill, it was unclear how
much of a role, or what kind of a role, practice guidelines
would play in federal health care reform measures. Clearly,
the federal government finds the use of practice guidelines
critical to the goal of providing cost-effective, quality health
care.
II. THE BASES OF DEVELOPERS' AND ISSUERS' LABmLIY
Because clinical practice guidelines are a relatively recent
phenomenon, there is little case or statutory law regarding
their legal implications. There has, however, been much schol-
arly work concerning the potential legal issues surrounding
such guidelines.70 One outstanding issue is the potential for
liability of the guideline developers and issuers. To date, there
State governments have not been as active as the federal government in
developing guidelines, although a number of guidelines have been developed at the
state level. The future of state-developed guidelines will depend on the degree of
health care reform at the state rather than federal level Sce Medical Malpractice
Guidelines, WESTERN J. MED., July 1994 at 39.
H?. 3600, 103rd Cong., § 1757 (1993).
This law became the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPPA ), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.)
"' See generally Rosoff, supra note 10, at 369; see also Butler, supra note 32,
at 843. Much of the scholarly work in this area has focused on the effect of guide-
lines on medical malpractice and decisionmaking.
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have not been any reported cases which focus solely on the
issue of guideline development liability, despite the magnitude
of guideline use by physicians, health maintenance organiza-
tions, and hospitals.7' Most scholarly work on guideline liabil-
ity has focused on the situation in which proof of a physician's
compliance with the appropriate guideline may shield the phy-
sician from malpractice liability.72
Since the number of organizations and individuals devel-
oping guidelines has tripled since 1990, 73 and the number of
actual guidelines has doubled,74 there is a growing concern
that guidelines are being developed under less than adequate
empirical conditions.75 Additionally, even though the federal
government has assigned to the AHCPR direct responsibility
for sponsoring the development of certain clinical practice
guidelines,76 there are currently no national standards or re-
quirements which must be followed by developers and issuers.
In addressing the potential liability of a guideline develop-
er, the initial inquiry must focus on the relationship between
the developer and the plaintiff, since liability will attach only if
"' Although there have been no cases which deal directly with the liability of
practice guideline developers, there have been several cases, discussed at length in
Part'III, which address the liability of utilization management review techniques.
Utilization management review involves prospective treatment decisions made by
managed care companies with the goal of reducing the cost of "unnecessary" medi-
cal treatment. See Wickline v. State of Cal., 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); see also Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
72 Maine has been the first state to recognize compliance with clinical practice
guidelines as an affirmative defense in medical malpractice cases. One of the most
controversial issues detailed in Maine's Medical Liability Demonstration Project is
the provision allowing physicians who follow the guidelines to use this compliance
as an affrmative defense in a malpractice action. The stated intent of this leg-
islation is to "develop practice standards, consistent with appropriate standards of
care, which will avoid malpractice claims and increase the defensibility of malprac-
tice claims." Butler, supra note 32, at 856. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§
2971, 2979 (West Supp. 1994)).
Similarly, in Minnesota, if a doctor complies with the practice guideline, it is
considered an absolute defense. See Brown & Procopio, supra note 35, at 1024.
The authors also raise an interesting point when they question the difficulty in
having a system in which a physician can use compliance with guidelines as a
defense, yet still act outside those guidelines.
See generally Rosoff, supra note 10.
7' See generally Rosoff, supra note 10.
See generally Rosoff, supra note 10.
7' Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 6103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
299 (1994)).
[V ol. 63:1341
CLTNICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND LABILI7Y
the developer owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Clearly, if a
plaintiff was harmed by a practice guideline that was devel-
oped and disseminated by an HIMO, there is no duty problem,
because the organization has an absolute duty with respect to
its participants, especially if the HMO is "forcing" its physi-
cians to utilize the guideline.7 If, however, the issuer is the
American Medical Association, there may be disagreement as
to whether that type of organization had a duty with respect to
a harmed individual. Certainly, the AMA could not possibly
owe a duty to every individual in the country.
Aside from the duty problem associated with suing an
organization such as the AMA, it and other similarly situated
medical associations, unlike managed care organizations, are
unlikely to face liability for developing practice guidelines for
an additional reason. Medical associations stress that practice
guidelines are parameters; they are not rigid, mandatory stan-
dards which must be followed in all situations."3 The AMA
urges all physicians to use their professional judgment in each
and every treatment decision, utilizing a practice guideline
only if it is found suitable for the situation.79
' HMOs may "force" physicians to abide by a certain practice guideline
through the use of financial incentives and disincentives. For example, an HMO
may provide bonuses to those doctors who abide by the guidelines, while those
physicians who do not meet certain compliance rates may see their number of
patients decreasing or they may be removed altogether from the HMO's list of
preferred providers. See Thomas W. Malone & Deborah EL Thaler, Managed
Health Care: A Plaintiffs Perspectiue, 32 TORT & INS. L. J. 123, 128 (Fall 1996)
(describing the use of financial incentives and disincentives by managed care com-
panies as a way to maintain costs).
"' See, eg., Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, 870 F.2d 397
(7th Cir. 1989). This case involved a statement made by the Academy of
Ophthalmology, suggesting that radial keratotomy was experimental and should be
used only with caution. The academy was sued by aggrieved ophthalmologists for
acting in a concerted fashion and restraining trade. The court concluded that there
could be no sense of restraint because the society had in no way threatened to
discipline or expel its members who performed radial keratotomy. This case high-
lights the potential dangers involved when medical organizations coerce their mem-
bers into adhering to rigid guidelines.
"' See Edward Hirshfeld, Use of Practice Parameters as Standards of Care and
in Health Care Reform: A View form the American fdical Association, 19 J. ON
QUALITY IMPROVEmENT 322, 323 (1993) (stating the position of the AMA:- [olut of
respect for the evolution of medicine, the AMNIA is concerned that making a set of
practice guidelines mandatory standards of care would stifle innovation and the
dissemination of medical advances.').
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In contrast, many HMOs and other managed care organi-
zations often regard CPGs as standards to be adhered to under
all reasonable circumstances. The essential difference between
the AMA as developer and the managed care company as de-
veloper stems from their respective philosophical positions
regarding the nature and the goals of CPGs. This underlying
difference is clearly demonstrated in their attitudes toward
cost-containment. The AMA is primarily concerned with devel-
oping guidelines which improve the quality of care; cost consid-
erations are not a central issue in their formulation, 80 as such
organizations do not reap financial gain from promulgating
guidelines that are developed to contain costs. Alternatively, a
managed care company is more likely to view cost-effective
treatment as the primary concern when developing guidelines,
which may result in the development of less scientifically-
based guidelines. Moreover, HMOs and managed care organi-
zations may pressure physicians through financial incentives
or disincentives to abide by the guidelines' prescribed treat-
ments.8
There are several possible bases for a developer's liability.
The first and most obvious basis could be negligence in the
analysis of the outcomes measurement data or negligence in
translating such data into clinical recommendations.82 A sec-
ond basis for liability could be negligence in constructing the
specifics of outcomes measurement studies, or using data that
the developer knew or should have known was inaccurate or
insufficient," or consciously omitting from the study a pos-
sible effective treatment. A court may also find liability on be-
half of a developer if it can be proven that there was a lack of
good faith on the part of the developer.'
" Even though the AMA and other similar organizations may not view cost-
effectiveness as a primary goal in guideline development, this will not shield them
completely from liability, especially if there is proof that the guideline was negli-
gently developed or not adequately maintained. If a plaintiffs attorney could
hurdle the question of duty, then the AMA should be held to the same standard
of care as any other organization in the development arena.
81 Practice guidelines cannot possibly benefit managed care companies unless
they are adopted into practice by the physicians. It will be interesting to see what
devices these companies will employ to increase compliance rates and how their
"encouragement" may play out in a court of law.
Rosoff, supra note 10, at 362.
Rosoff, supra note 10, at 362.
84 See Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (1990) in which
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A fourth basis for liability could be the developer's failure
to update and maintain its guidelines. With rapid advances in
medical technology and treatments, the developer would have
a unique obligation to maintain the efficacy of the guidelines.
Questions abound as to the frequency of guideline updates and
reviews and whether information that a guideline may be near
obsolescence must be disseminated by the developer.' Addi-
tionally, if a developer advertises that its guidelines are on the
cutting edge of the industry, this could constitute a contractual
claim that binds the developer. The potential for liability may
require that the developer not only stay abreast of medical ad-
vances and developments, but also actively continue to re-
search the guidelines' outcomes, especially after the guide-
lines are disseminated and used in a wide range of circum-
stances."6 The developer is in the ideal position to collect out-
comes research and effectiveness data regarding their guide
plaintiffs attempted to show that the insurer and utilization management company,
which had allegedly authorized the premature discharge of a psychiatric patient
who committed suicide, had breached the legal obligation for a good faith inves-
tigation of claims. For a fuller discussion, see infra Part I.
There will likely be many issues regarding good faith liability due to the
increasing number of managed care and health maintenance organizations that are
involved in guideline development. One can imagine scenarios in which managed
care companies may consciously omit research on certain types of expensive, exper-
imental treatments because of the fear that these expensive treatments may be
found to be extremely effective, thereby requiring the company to cover these
procedures. This type of liability goes beyond negligence because it would involve
the maligned intent of the company. Pharmaceutical companies are another type of
organization conducting outcomes research. These companies also have great incen-
tives to "prove" that their product is the best one on the market for X" disease.
These types of conflicting interests cause concern and doubt as to the true effec-
tiveness of certain practice guidelines. See infra Part 1I.
An interesting and related issue which has not been addressed by the court
system, and is beyond the scope of this Note, involves what type of obligation the
developers owe to the public to study and research certain types of highly experi-
mental treatments that are very costly yet very effective.
In Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.3d 177 (D.C. 1990), the court
required that providers adopt new devices to keep pace with the rapidly advancing
state of technology. In Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hasp., 88 A.D.2d 217, 452
N.Y.S.2d 875 (1982) the court held a hospital and its physicians liable for not fol-
lowing new treatment studies that contravened conventional wisdom.
I See Rosoff, supra note 10, at 392 (speculating that those groups or individu-
als with special access to critical information may well have a corresponding obli-
gation to make effective use of that information).
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lines. It is precisely this type of information that helps to cre-
ate reliable and valid practice guidelines which can be utilized
on a widespread basis.
III. LIABILITY OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND
MANAGED CARE COMPANIES AS DEVELOPERS AND ISSUERS OF
CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES
Although the development of clinical practice guidelines
may originally have been spurred by a desire to more effective-
ly treat illnesses and consequently improve the quality of
health care," their concurrent effect of maintaining and cut-
ting costs did not go unnoticed. Because the use of CPGs re-
sults in cost-effective medical care by eliminating unnecessary
care, the guidelines are finding their greatest use in managed
care settings, including health maintenance organizations and
' Guideline developers owe a duty to the public to maintain their guidelines
and continue to research their outcomes. For practice guidelines to have a positive
effect on quality treatment, rather than simply cost-effective treatment, physicians
must find them credible and reliable. It is essential that developers do their part
to ensure that if a guideline is widely adopted and becomes a statement of cus-
tomary practice, that the developer is reaping critical information from the out-
comes of these physicians' data. See infra Part IV.
" This statement is still being debated. Some health care experts contend that
quality care was always the driving force behind the guidelines, while other ex-
perts argue that cost-containment played an equally significant if not more signifi-
cant role in guideline development. For example, the Agency for Health Care Poli-
cy and Research, the federal organization responsible for developing certain nation-
al guidelines, makes no mention of cost-effectiveness or cost-containment as a goal
or an issue with respect to the development of guidelines.
See also Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation:
Collision or Cohesion?, 16 JOURNAL OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 67, 70 (1991).
Brennan differentiates between "appropriateness" guidelines and "standard-of-care"
guidelines. "Appropriateness" guidelines are intended to reduce care that is unnec-
essary of inefficient in cost; cost-effectiveness is usually the driving force behind
development of these typis of guidelines. "Standard-of-care" guidelines emphasize
outcomes, not cost-efficiency. These guidelines define the standard of practice, "pro-
sumably as a result of implicit or explicit assessment of outcomes," and are not
motivated by cost-efficiency. Id. at 70. Finally, there are experts who contend that
it was a combination of several factors, including the rising costs of health care,
the perception that much of the cost was due to inappropriate clinical practices,
and the belief that guidelines might help physicians reduce practice variation and
enhance the quality of patient care, that led to the escalation in guideline develop-
ment. Woolf, supra note 5, at 1456 (citing Annual Report to Congress: Physician
Payment Review Commission, Washington, D.C. 1989 at 219); see also Brennan,
supra, at 67.
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other managed care organizations ("MCOs").' Because such
organizations have a considerable stake in containing costs,
profit-motivated decisionmaking is likely to increase both the
risks and liabilities associated with the delivery of health
care.
90
A. Extending Liability to HMOs: Consumers Suing M Os for
Faulty Development of CPGs.9'
The term "managed care" generally refers to "a system
that, in varying degrees, integrates the financing and delivery
of health care through contracts with selected physicians and
hospitals that provide comprehensive health care services to
enrolled members for a predetermined... premium.'s Man-
aged care organizations are all similar in at least one respect:
they involve an attempt to control costs by modifying the man-
ner in which patients utilize the health care system.' The
term "managed care" encompasses several different types of
' Three-quarters of all health maintenance organizations have practice guide-
lines in place, more than 70% conduct outcomes research of common clinical condi-
tions and almost all have utilization review protocols in place. Marsha R. Gold et
al, A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed Care Plans Mahe With Physi-
cians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1680-1 (1995); see also Phil Douglas, Medi-
cine's Brave New World, PHYS. PRAC. DIG., Fall 1995 at 12 (indicating that some
reports estimate that 65% of insured people in the United States receive medical
care through managed care arrangements).
' See Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan Liability in the
Age of Managed Care, 62 DEFENSE COUNS. J. 191 (1995) (warning that because
cost-containment mechanisms may directly affect the medical care received by
health plan patients, they increase the liability potential for the plan providers,
administrators, insurers and sponsors).
9" This section is specifically separated from Part 11, which discusses theories
of liability in general. Because plaintiffs historically have had a difficult time suc-
cessfully suing managed care companies for treatment decisions, a fuller discussion
is required as to the theories of liability that may successfully get plaintiffs past
some of the barriers inherent in suing insurers. It is only after addressing this
that the discussion in Part H will be relevant, because there are enormous differ-
ences in potential liability depending on who is developing the guideline.
"Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 125 (quoting John K. Inglehart, Health
Policy Report: Physicans and the Growth of Managed Care, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1167 (1994).
' Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 126.
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health care organizations, including health maintenance orga-
nizations," preferred provider organizations ("PPOs) 95 and
point of service plans. 6
The active involvement of HMOs and other managed care
companies in the development of CPGs has interesting and
uncertain complications for both the companies and the physi-
cians who work for them.97 Historically, managed care compa-
nies were able to avoid liability when their physicians were
sued for medical malpractice, under the "corporate practice of
medicine" doctrine.9" This doctrine forbids a licensed physi-
cian from accepting instructions in diagnosing or treating ill-
nesses from a corporation or an individual who is not licensed
to practice medicine.99 The purpose of the doctrine was to fos-
" In a health maintenance organization physicians are under contract to pro-
vide medical care at a lower price than their customary fee. There are three m~jor
HMO models which need to be defined in order to fully understand the types of
liability that attach to each: 1) under a staff model HMO, the HMO employs staff
physicians directly and compensates them as salaried employees, placing them in a
traditional employer-employee type relationship. Usually, staff model physicians
work together in a centralized facility owned or leased by the HMO; 2) under a
group model, the HMO contracts with a group of physicians rather than with the
physicians individually. The IMOs' claim that the physicians are independent
contractors, not employees. Physicians receive payment on the capitation system,
meaning a fixed monthly fee per member, regardless of the amount of service
actually rendered; 3) under the independent practice association model (IPA), the
most common form of managed care organization, the HMO contracts with an
independent practice association. The association then contracts directly with each
independent physician with regard to terms and conditions of employment and
method of payment. Generally, IPAs do not work exclusively or even primarily for
the IMO. Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 128.
"' A PPO is an organized group of providers offering services at a discount.
PPOs compete with HMOs in that both are organized to provide discounted medi-
cal services. The PPO often resembles a traditional direct payment insurance plan
in that the subscriber pays the PPO directly and the PPO then reimburses the
doctors and the hospital. PPO members can choose their own physician whether or
not they are a part of the plan. Although PPOs discourage patients from going
outside of the plan, they differ from an HMO in that fee-for-service physicians do
not have financial incentives to voluntarily minimize patient hospitalization stays.
A point of service plan is a hybrid of an HIO and a PPO.
For a complete discussion of managed care companies and emerging theories
of liability, see Richard A. Hinden & Douglas L. Elden, Liability Issues for Man-
aged Care Entities, 14 SEMoN HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1990).
9' See Butler, supra note 32, at 863; see also Reuben, supra note 1, at 55.
Reuben, supra note 1, at 56. The "corporate practice of medicine doctrine"
essentially barred "direct malpractice lawsuits against most types of HMOs and
managed-care entities on the theory that they are not corporations formed to prac-
tice medicine; rather they are formed like insurance companies just to pay for the
treatments." Id.
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ter physician autonomy by preventing physicians who were
working for corporations from being controlled by those corpo-
rations. Practically, the doctrine has worked to shield man-
aged-care entities from liability on the theory that "they are
not corporations formed to practice medicine; rather, they are
formed like insurance companies just to pay for the treat-
ments."°°
However, with managed care organizations in the business
of developing guidelines, they are somewhat curiously in the
business of practicing medicine. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that in the future a managed care company will be able to rely
solely on this doctrine as a shield from liability. It will be diffi-
cult for a company to convince a court that it was not in the
business of practicing medicine, especially when "adherence to
CPGs, at some level at least, may be a condition of participa-
tion for physicians and other providers joining HMOs or other
cost-constrained health plans."01 The public is likely to be
sympathetic to physicians and the precarious position in which
they are placed by managed care companies. Physicians face
tremendous pressures to adhere to their managed care compa-
nies' myriad regulations. Previously, many such regulations
were not viewed as directly affecting patient health. Today,
however, managed care organizations' involvement with de-
veloping and mandating compliance with practice guidelines is
one example of techniques available in the health care indus-
try to strong-arm physicians and patients.
Physicians reluctantly recognize that failure to abide by
promulgated practice guidelines set forth by their managed
care company could result in harsh consequences. For example,
physicians who exercise independent clinical judgment and
determine that a certain guideline is not applicable to their
patient's situation risk not being reimbursed by the health care
company for that procedure. The doctor is then faced with
mounting out-of-pocket expenses as a result of his or her deci-
sion to deviate from the guideline. Many physicians may also
face termination from the health care company if it is found
that they have not been abiding by prescribed guidelines. Man-
o Reuben, supra note 1, at 56. (stating that this doctrine is often an early
battleground in litigation).
... Rosoff supra note 10, at 373.
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aged care companies exert this type of control over physicians
by conducting regular inquiries into the physician's history of
treatment, keeping careful watch on a physician's utilization
of treatments. Similarly, physicians not working directly for a
particular managed care organization may face elimination
from the rosters of health care providers so that new patients
will not be given their name as a prospective provider. When
faced with these consequences, it is not hard to see how physi-
cians can be influenced to treat patients precisely the way the
managed care company dictates.0 2 It seems that the more
that HMOs and other managed care companies exercise control
over their participating physicians, the more their exposure to
liability for the torts of the doctors will continue to in-
crease.
03
Because plaintiffs' attorneys have in the past had a diffi-
cult time getting past the "corporate practice of medicine"
threshold defense in medical malpractice suits against specific
third party payers and hospitals, they may rely on several
additional theorites: vicarious liability, simple and corporate
negligence, and contractual liability.' These theories may
also prove to be viable in the inevitable lawsuits which will
arise from faulty development or maintenance of clinical prac-
tice guidelines.
" In an effort to protect consumers against these types of problems, some state
legislation is proposing that managed care organizations disclose the following in-
formation: any financial incentives offered to physicians who are frugal in provid-
ing services, information about grievance procedures, utilization review quality
assurance programs and ownership interests. This information is taking the label
of "report card," and is being used to educate individual consumers about the
various plans. See Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What
Are The Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1007, 1017 (1996). But see Jason Ross
Penzer, Grading The Report Card. Lessons From Cognitive Psychology, Marketing,
and the Law of Information Disclosure For Quality Assessment in Health Care
Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (1995) (discussing "the drawbacks of relying on
health care report cards as a quality assurance system" and concluding that "re-
port cards cannot currently assure quality, given limitations in the state of the art
of quality measurement and an inadequate understanding of how consumers would
process disclosed information." Id.
1"3 See Reuben, supra note 1, at 56 (quoting Domenick C. DiCicco Jr., a litiga-
tor handling matters for insurance companies, who calls the liability issue "a di-
saster waiting to happen.")
104 See David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability For Med-
ical Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861 (1990); see also Reuben, supra note
1, at 56.
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1. Vicarious Liability
Traditionally, a hospital would not be held vicariously
liable for negligent acts of its medical staff which occurred
during treatment of patients. This is because a hospital, as an
institution, could not be licensed to practice medicine. Under
this theory, physicians were considered to be independent
contractors over which the hospitals exerted no control. 15
However, over the past three decades, courts have gradually
eroded this rule by recognizing the applicability of respondeat
superior to salaried physicians."' 6 Although courts today ap-
pear increasingly likely to find hospitals responsible for con-
trolling the actions of their physicians, it remains to be decided
whether courts will extend the notion of respondeat superior to
the relationship between physicians and third party payers,
such as HMOs and MCOs. 10 7
105 Griner, supra note 104, at 892.
'o See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligent
acts of an employee committed within the scope of employment. See RESTATEMENrT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); see also Griner, supra note 104, at 891-92.
(under the doctrine of respondeat superior, hospitals have always been liable for
the negligence of their employees; however, medical staff in the performance of
medical acts were not traditionally considered employees of the hospitals).
,' See Griner, supra note 104, at 892. In 1990, when Griner wrote this article,
clinical pathway guideline development was in its infancy. This author speculated,
without addressing the issue of clinical pathway guidelines, that the doctrine of
respondent superior would certainly be applicable to direct-service plans, such as a
staff model HMO where the physician is an actual employee of the health orga-
nization. However, he found it increasingly more problematic to extend the doc-
trine to other model HM situations or other private insurance situations in
which the third party payer does not limit subscriber access to providers and the
providers are usually independent contractors rather than actual employees. In
1990, the percentage of people subscribing to a staff model HMO where the pa-
tient must choose the provider from the third party payer's list of accepted phy-
sicians, was much lower than it is today.
Additionally, the Restatement of Agency § 8 and § 159 recognize an exception
to respondeat superior. RESTATMNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 8, 159 (1958). This
exception, often referred to as apparent authority or ostensible agency, can also be
applied to a third party payer in limited circumstances. Under this theory, a third
party payer could be responsible for the negligence of an independent physician if
the third party payer represented to the patient, or gave the appearance that the
physician was an employee. Again, David Griner finds this application of apparent
authority limited to third party payers that offer a closed panel of providers, like
some HMOs" which can give the appearance that an agency relationship exists by
virtue of their control over the medical care delivery system. Griner, supra note
104, at 894. Again, however, when this article was written, the conventional insur-
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The determination of whether a physician is actually an
independent contractor will be crucial in extending liability to
a corporate managed care organization." 8 For example, if the
physician is a member of a staff model HMO, courts appear
more likely to find the HMO answerable for the decision to
utilize one practice guideline over another because the physi-
cian is viewed as a direct employee of the HIMO. Because a
staff model HMO physician has significantly less autonomy
than would an independent physician, is paid directly by the
HMO, and most often conducts his/her business in an HMO-
owned facility, courts are more likely to find liability attaching
to the HMO under the theories of vicarious liability or ostensi-
ble/apparent agency.0 9
A staff model physician depends solely on the HMO for his
or her livelihood, making its control over the physician's deci-
sions almost complete. If, however, the treating physician is an
independent practitioner who treats only a few HMO patients
and whose bulk of patients stems from private insurance,
courts appear more likely to hold the treating physician solely
responsible because of the lesser level of control over the inde-
pendent practitioner's decisions."' This type of physician
would not be considered an employee of the HMO because he
is not paid directly by the HMO, nor is he working from an
HMO-owned or leased facility, making it unlikely the courts
would find liability under either vicarious liability or the os-
tensible/apparent agency theories.'' In Allrid v. Emory Uni-
versity,"2 the court stated that "[tihe true test of whether the
relationship is one of employer-employee or employer-indepen-
dent contractor is whether the employer... assumes the right
ance plan, where patients typically have a free choice of physicians, was much
more widely subscribed to than other third party payer situations, like the health
maintenance organization. Thus, with the rise in subscription to health mainte-
nance organizations, we may see a substantial increase in this type of liability.
108 Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 131.
'o' Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 131.
11 Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 131.
... The doctrine of ostensible or apparent agency, an offshoot of vicarious liabili-
ty, can be used to impose liability when the evidence shows that: 1) the apparent
principal represented or held out the apparent agent; and 2) justifiable reliance
upon the represontation led to the injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
267 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1958).
285 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1982).
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to control the time, manner and method of executing the work,
as distinguished from the right merely to require certain defi-
nite results in conformity to the contract.""
Clearly, if a staff model physician is abiding by prescribed
HMO practice guidelines, liability for reliance on a faulty
guideline should attach to the HMO, because they are clearly
the employer in such a relationship and the physician is clear-
ly the employee. While it would be more difficult to attach
liability to the HIO if the physician were not a staff memiber
of the organization, an argument could be made that, although
the physician is not technically an employee of the organiza-
tion, the HMO, through its insistence on compliance with
guidelines, exerts sufficient control over manner and method of
treatment."4 Although managed care companies may defend
on the ground that the physician is an independent contractor,
this defense seems weak after showing that the managed care
company is in the business of developing and promulgating
practice guidelines, thus engaging in treatment decisions."
Another basis of liability which has been used to hold hos-
pitals liable for the acts of their physicians has been apparent
or ostensible agency."6 This doctrine differs from respondeat
superior in that liability will only attach if the apparent princ-
pal represented or held out the physician as the apparent
agent, and there was justifiable reliance upon the representa-
tion which led to the injury. This theory may result in in-
creased liability against a managed care company because the
1 3 Id. at 525-6.
.. Some cases have suggested that vicarious liability will attach merely when
the employer exerts control over time or salary without control over manner or
method. See Newton County Hosp. v. Nickolson, 207 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974). This may suggest that control over manner or method may also suffice to
find vicarious liability on behalf of the employer.
"15 Thomas W. Malone argues that even though managed care companies may
claim as a defense the fact that the physician is an independent contractor, there
are other factors which may support a finding of an employer-employee relation-
ship. Malone states that:
These include requirements by HBMOs and [other managed care compa-
nies] of pre-authorization of elective hospital admissions and other proce-
dures, concurrent review of length of stays, charge fees set by the HIMO,
and failure to abide by the managed care organization's regulations as
cause for the corporation to remove the physician from its provider list.
Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 133.
11. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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physician is not required to be an employee of the company.
Conceivably, a managed care company could be liable for the
actions of an independent contractor physician if the patient
justifiably relied on the skill of the physician in the belief that
the physician was an employee of the managed care compa-
ny.- 1
In determining whether apparent agency exists, courts
engage in an extensive, fact-intensive inquiry into whether the
HMO or other managed care company held the physician out
to be the agent of the HMO. In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical
Center,"' the plaintiff alleged negligent oversight and failure
to furnish adequate care on behalf of the HMO. The court
found the HMO liable under the apparent agency theory, high-
lighting that: 1) the patient's fees were paid directly to the
HMO, not the individual doctor; 2) subscribers were required
to choose their primary care physicians from a limited list; 3)
the physician list was screened by the HMO and physicians
were required to follow HMO rules and regulations; and 4) the
promotional materials distributed by the HMO stated that the
HMO would provide health care services and benefits to its
members in order "to protect and promote their health.""'
Liability under this theory would almost certainly attach to
staff model and group model HMOs.
Interestingly, liability may also attach to physicians who
are not employed by the managed care organization. For exam-
ple, in Dunn v. Praiss,'2 the court found that an agency rela-
tionship existed where the HMO exercised considerable control
over the independent physicians by controlling the patients
they see and by paying on a per capita basis.'' When HMOs
force physicians to abide by their practice guidelines, courts
should find that this is tantamount to exerting considerable,
legally-significant control over independent physicians. By
threatening HMOs with this type of liability, we may see a
fundamental change in the way HMOs and other managed
.1. The apparent/ostensible agency theory relies on appearances. The actual con-
tractual arrangements between the managed care company and the provider may
prove irrelevant. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 135.
118 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
... See Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 135.
"o 606 A.2d 1053 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
See Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 136-7.
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care companies engage in medical decisionmaking. HIOs may
find it too costly to play the liability game with respect to prac-
tice guidelines, with the result that physicians may begin to
enjoy some essential autonomy in clinical decisionmakdng.
2. Corporate Negligence
The theory of corporate negligence has been relied upon in
medical malpractice suits against third party payers.' This
doctrine espouses that HMOs owe a duty to patients to exer-
cise reasonable care to ensure the competence of physicians
and staff they hire.' More generally, this theory focuses on
the overall independent duty of the organization to protect the
patient from harm. Thus, a plaintifs attorney could poten-
tially show that the HMO or other third party payer involved
in guideline development was legally negligent in construction
of the guideline which the physician followed. Presumably, this
would be a costly and fact-intensive approach as it would es-
sentially involve a thorough review of all the evidence, medical
research, and criteria used to create the guideline. It would
also involve an analysis as to whether the physician should
have blindly followed the purported guideline or should have
independently engaged in the above-mentioned inquiry.
3. Third Party Payer Negligence
A plaintiff's attorney could also rely on a simple negli-
gence theory to prove that the HMO or other third party payer
was negligent in guideline construction or negligent in relying
on or issuing to their staff physicians practice guidelines pro-
mulgated by other sources which were inadequate, incorrect or
unreliable. It is conceivable that managed care companies
could choose to adopt guidelines from outside sources and ad-
vocate their use among its own plan physicians. If, however,
the company did not adequately consider or assess the reliabil-
' Griner, supra note 104, at 895 (noting that most courts have refused to
follow this theory).
The corporate negligence theory has been applied to hospitals since the mid-
1960s. It was extended to HMOs in the late 1980s. See Harrell v. Total Health
Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989); see also Reuben, supra note 1, at 57.
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ity and accuracy of the guidelines prior to their complete adop-
tion and required usage, the company could be faced with lia-
bility.
Similarly, there have been some cases dealing with third
party payer liability for medically inappropriate decisions
made through the implementation of cost-controlling
decisionmakdng. Utilization management review, 124 a cost-
controlling mechanism which may be considered a precursor to
CPGs, was featured in Wickline v. State of California," the
first major case to deal directly with the liability of third party
payers for improper use of cost-containment procedures. In
Wickline, the plaintiff, a hospital patient, sued the state alleg-
ing a negligent recommendation derived from utilization re-
view by California's medical assistance program ("Medi-Cal").
The plaintiff was hospitalized with leg and back pain that re-
quired surgery. After the plaintiff experienced some
postsurgical complications, her physicians requested that Medi-
Cal authorize an additional eight days of hospitalization." 6
The Medi-Cal reviewers refused to approve the request for an
eight-day extension, but did authorize a four-day extension.
124 Generally, utilization review refers to "external evaluations that are based on
established clinical criteria and are conducted by third party payers, purchasers, or
health care organizers to evaluate the appropriateness of an episode, or series of
episodes, of medical care." John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health
Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REV. 191, 192-3 (cit-
ing CONOR, ET AL., DYNAncS OF UTIJZATION MANAGEMENT, AMERICAN HOSPITAL
ASSOCIATION (1983).
1 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Utilization review is widely used in
both public and private sectors as a cost-containment strategy with its principle
focus to prevent overutilization and maximize revenues by increasing the amount
of service provided and to insure that patients were not unnecessarily exposed to
risks as a result of unnecessary surgery and/or hospitalization.
A crucial question regarding utilization management is how much variation
among reviewer clinical judgments should be allowed for the same situation, and
what considerations this variation should be based upon. The parallels to practice
guideline proliferation is obvious. It may be helpful to think of utilization review
as the precursor to CPGs-as a basis for the more fine-tuned development of clini-
cal practice guideline development. Utilization review and practice guideline use
differ in that utilization review decisions are made by consultants/employees of the
third party payer, and they are often not physicians. With clinical guidelines, it is
the physicians themselves who are following the guideline, the only middleman
being the guideline itself.
12 Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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The plaintiff was released and consequently suffered severe
clotting and infection, which resulted in the eventual amputa-
tion of her leg.'
At trial, the jury found that Medi-Cal had been negligent
and awarded plaintiff $500,000. On appeal, the decision was
reversed.s Although the appeals court held that Medi-Cal
was not responsible for the patient injury resulting from the
utilization review decision because the decision to release the
plaintiff was not a negligent one and was in accord with the
then existing statutory law,' the court issued a strong state-
ment regarding future claims of this type:
[The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when
care which should have been provided is not provided should recover
for the injuries suffered from all those responsible for the depriva-
tion of such care, including, when appropriate, health care payers.
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally ac-
countable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects
in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as,
for example when appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or
hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or overridden.'
With this statement, the court made it clear that although
Medi-Cal was not liable in this situation, that court would not
hesitate to find liability in the proper circumstances.'"'
Many parallels can be drawn between the utilization man-
agement review processes in Wickline and the process of mak-
ing treatment decisions based on a practice guideline set forth
by a managed care company. Both can be viewed as primarily
cost-containing mechanisms which enjoy widespread use in
health care. They also share the common denominator that the
17Id.
Griner, supra note 104, at 887 (discussing the jury decision in Wc' .cine).
See Griner, supra note 104, at 887.
Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the courts dicta, the Wiwidine decision sent a clear mes-
sage to practitioners and providers that anyone involved in or affected by utiliza-
tion management decisions should diligently seek appeal of these determinations or
face sole liability.
A significant barrier to an action of this type is presented by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1361 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986), which severely limits the availability of state tort actions in the context
of health benefits plans falling under the statute. This Note does not address the
implications of ERISA, but a careful analysis of this statute must be completed as
to any potential action to determine whether it may be preempted.
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treating physician is often not the individual making the utili-
zation review decision nor deciding on which guideline to fol-
low.
Interestingly, third party payers' insistence that physi-
cians abide by their developed guidelines offers a much stron-
ger basis for liability than an insurer's utilization review
decision. This is so because in the past, utilization review deci-
sions have been viewed primarily as "benefits" decisions, rath-
er than "medical decisions.""2 The distinction between bene-
fits decisions and medical decisions is crucial to overcoming the
corporate practice of medicine barrier faced by many plaintiffs'
lawyers. If a utilization review company can persuade a court
that they were engaging in a type of benefits decision and not
an actual medical decision, the company is more likely to avoid
liability on the basis that it is not licensed to practice medi-
cine; therefore, it cannot be seen to make medical decisions. Al-
ternatively, a managed care company engaging in the design
and implementation of clinical practice guidelines is clearly
"practicing medicine," and should certainly be held accountable
if it is determined that the company pressured its physicians
into adhering to their guidelines. 3
"' In Wickline, the court held it was the treating physician's direct responsibili-
ty to decide the course of treatment medically necessary to treat the plaintiff's
ailment. 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The court distinguished between decisions made by
Medi-Cal and decisions made by the treating physician by stating that Medi-Cal
was not viewed as a party to the medical decision which released plaintiff from
the hospital. The court stated that:
while Medi-Cal played a part in the scenario before us in that it was the
resource for the funds to pay for the treatment sought, and its input
regarding the nature and length of hospital care to be provided was of
paramount importance, Medi-Cal did not override the medical judgment
of wickline's treating physicians at the time of her discharge.
Id. See also Blum, supra note 124, at 199 (stating that the heart of Wickline is its
holding that the Medi-Cal program cannot be held liable for negligently discharg-
ing a patient because that decision is a medical one and falls outside the purview
of third party utilization management).
Arguably, the landscape is changing with respect to how much independent
clinical judgment by physicians will be accepted by managed care companies.
Courts are likely to recognize the pressures placed on physicians, realizing that
physicians are often not "free" to act on their own judgment. Hence, a court may
be more likely to find liability on behalf of the managed care companies.
' The individual physician, however, may also risk liability if he or she relies
on faulty guidelines. Physicians, along with managed care companies, will be vul-
nerable to malpractice actions and should expect to be held legally accountable if
their actions are not in the best interests of patients.
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In a follow-up case to Wickline, Wilson v. Blue Cross of
Southern California,' the plaintiffs attempted to show that
the insurer and the utilization review company had breached
the legal obligation of a good faith investigation of claims. In
Wilson, a utilization review decision allegedly authorized pre-
mature release of a psychiatric patient. After release based on
the utilization review recommendation, the patient committed
suicide. Despite the defendants' argument that Wickline had
established that liability rested ultimately with the treating
physician, who had acted in response to the utilization review
recommendation, the court found substantial evidence that the
utilization review decision not to authorize continued hospital-
ization was a critical factor in the patient's death.' Ulti-
mately, a jury found that the utilization review company had
breached three of the four elements of bad faith, but not the
fourth; thus, no liability was found against the defendants.
Nevertheless, Wilson supports the proposition that insurers,
utilization management companies, HMOs and other managed
care companies can be held liable for the consequences of their
decisions.136
4. Contractual Liability
Managed care organizations and other third party insurers
involved in developing practice guidelines may also be liable
under the contractual theory that the organization breached its
covenant of good faith. Most legal decisions that have ad-
dressed this type of liability are based upon the reckless denial
of coverage. 7 However, an argument can be made that when
managed care companies contract with patients and then re-
quire physicians to abide by medical treatment decisions that
they have decided upon, the company has a continuing respon-
sibility to its participants to conduct good faith investigations
into the adequacy and reliability of the practice guidelines
being used. The breach of good faith inquiry would focus on the
efforts of the organization to assure the reliability and validity
n' 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. CL App. 1990).
Id. at 883.
See Alice G. Gosfield, Utilization Management Law and Policy: Emerging
Liability Trends, 9 No. 11 HEALTMSPAN 3, 5 (Dec. 1992).
'7 See Malone & Thaler, supra note 77, at 140.
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of their proffered guidelines. This theory may be particularly
pertinent to situations involving negligent maintenance of
practice guidelines and may be used when it can be proven
that managed care companies purposefully and knowingly
disregarded essential data or outcomes research that should
have been incorporated into the guideline. This egregious be-
havior would lend itself to claims of breach of good faith where
the omitted data was found highly effective but had cost-ef-
fective draw-backs for the company. 3 '
B. Physicians Suing HMOs: Indemnification for Forced Compli-
ance
A potentially explosive new area of litigation centers
around physicians suing HMOs and other MCOs for essentially
forcing the physician to discount his or her professional judg-
ment in treating a patient who is a member of the health care
organization. The problem with this type of suit is that courts
have traditionally viewed the treating physician as primarily
responsible for a patient's treatment.' However, with the
proliferation of practice guidelines, especially within the MCO
communities, courts may have to recognize a new defense set
forth by physicians facing medical malpractice actions: the
"HMO made me do it" defense."' This potential defense
would rest on the notion that if a treatment decision is not
made in good faith and is made primarily to contain costs
rather than provide quality treatment, there should be some
relief available to the physician.
Currently, though, these physicians are "plaintiffs in
search of a theory."" Because most provider/third party pay-
er contracts allow either party to terminate the relationship
without cause, it is difficult for a physician to prove he/she was
1" It is essential to remember that this discussion is only speculative. Very few
states have explicitly permitted a suit based on a utilization review decision about
medical care and to date, no state has directly addressed the liability for develop-
ment of practice guidelines.
139 See wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In
Wickline, the court held that primary responsibility for the patient's treatment
decisions rested with the physician, not the HMO. See supra notes 126-32 and
accompanying text.
14 See Reuben, supra note 1, at 60.
141 Reuben, supra note 1, at 60.
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compelled into a treatment decision against better judgment or
that they terminated the physician because he/she did not
follow mandatory guidelines laid out by the MCO and not for
other reasons. One possible theory for terminated physicians is
based in contract: the idea that the termination of a physician
violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
traditionally read into contracts.' This defense has not been
recognized in any court of law to date; however, with the num-
ber of cases expected to center around MCOs' utilization re-
view decisions and clinical practice guideline development and
implementation, one may expect to see this defense recog-
nized.'
This is a volatile area of litigation because the relied-upon
providers may be placing the public health at risk by being
compelled by large managed care companies into certain meth-
ods of treatment which may be inadequate, incorrect or with
which they may strongly disagree. Additionally, litigation may
flourish because there is no ERISA preemption problem, no
state limits on punitive damages and no arbitration clauses in
physician contracts.'
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE
There is an increasing probability of lawsuits being
initiated against developers and issuers of clinical pathway
guidelines. This is a positive thing, on the one hand, because it
should force developers to conduct comprehensive and proper
analyses of outcomes research data that will result in highly
credible and effective treatment protocols. On the other hand,
the potential for liability may have a chilling effect on the
development of clinical practice guidelines. This would be a
troublesome and detrimental result, because CPGs potentially
42 Reuben, supra note 1, at 60. (citing to Harper v. Healthsource N.H., 674
A-2d 962 (N.H. 1996) (finding that refusal to reappoint a surgeon to a panel after
ten years with the HNMO could violate public policy and allowing the surgeon to
challenge the decision on the ground that the termination violated the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing)).
"4 Ironically, the result the physician is trying to avoid, termination of hisiher
employment, would be expected if such a suit was brought against a managed
care company.
1" See Reuben, supra note 1, at 60.
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provide sound, scientific underpinnings necessary to reduce
uncertainties in health care decisionmaking. Fearing exposure
to liability, many organizations are likely to find it too risky to
be involved in this type of medical development. The potential
decline in guideline development would certainly adversely
affect the medical community, as CPGs are a sound way to
optimize quality care, eliminate waste and avoid unnecessary
procedures. However, because of their potential to contain
costs they may be abused by influential organizations, and the
developers must be held accountable for ineffective health care
due to compulsory applications and faulty, inadequate and
unreliable guidelines, which could expose patients to unneces-
sary risks.
One seemingly effective way to remedy this unfortunate
situation is to require that any proposed practice guidelines be
certified, or "blessed" as it is often called, before they are ap-
proved.'45 This type of quality control review most likely
would be done by a governmental body, at either the state or
federal level. The most likely candidate is the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research.'
" See Rosoff, supra note 10, at 373, 383. Rosoff addresses whether or not the
AHCPR should be the sole official generator of CPGs, a government facilitator to
foster their development by others, or the official body for reviewing and certifying
CPGs.
See also Kadzielski, supra note 8, at 161. The author parallels the need for
practice guideline certification to the solidly established approval process of new
drugs by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Before any new drug is intro-
duced to the public, the FDA requires assurances that the drug is safe and effec-
tive. Practice guidelines affect the public health in the same way that drugs do;
therefore, why should a practice guideline be introduced immediately into the
public domain prior to tests for safety and efficacy of the guideline? By failing to
have a certification process, the area is and will continue to be ripe for abuse,
because there is currently no legal responsibility for faulty guidelines.
'" This Note is not arguing that the federally funded AHCPR should be the
sole generator of guidelines, only that they would be a well-qualified organization
to engage in certification. The AHCPR has earned widespread respect as a guide-
line developer for several reasons: first, AHCPR guidelines are created by private-
sector, multi-disciplinary panels of experts; second, the guidelines are based on
extensive literature reviews and reflect the best scientific evidence available; third,
the guidelines are subjected to intensive scrutiny by peer reviewers and on-site
clinical evaluations by potential users to assess validity, efficacy and applicability;
fourth, they include analysis of the use and cost of health care resources and
assessment of the feasibility of implementation; and finally, they are regularly
updated to incorporate new information. MEDICAL OUTCOMES, supra note 4, at 168.
1378 [Vrol. 63: 1341
CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND LIABILITY
This requirement of certification or accreditation would
serve several important functions. First, if a neutral body is re-
sponsible for conducting efficacy tests on developing guidelines
as well as maintaining responsibility for their continual updat-
ing, there will be greater safeguards against inadequate and
faulty CPGs. This will result in a reduction in the number of
health care risks and medical malpractice suits brought
against developers. Furthermore, if a governmental agency is
chosen as a neutral body to collect CPGs from varied sources,
certify and disseminate them under its own auspices, the agen-
cy would almost certainly enjoy immunity for their develop-
ment.14 Additionally, the government agency responsible for
certification would not face the same competing interests
which confront the managed care companies: effective health
care would not be overshadowed by the mandate to contain
costs, because the agency would have no incentive to place cost
savings above appropriate medical care. Moreover, the body
certifying the guidelines would be certain to stress that they
are always voluntary and do not define the approach to every
case, reminding and permitting many providers to exercise
their professional judgment in each case.
Second, by continuing to allow all individuals and organi-
zations to remain involved in guideline development by adding
the certification requirement rather than unduly narrowing the
field of development to one body charged with creating CPGs,
innovation in clinical practice will not be impeded. While there
are genuine concerns regarding managed care companies
which create practice guidelines, it cannot be denied that these
types of organizations are often the most well-equipped to
engage in CPG development because of the vast amount of
information and resources available to them. Having hundreds
of patients and doctors on their rosters and plans, managed
care companies are often in the best position to conduct out-
comes research and develop guidelines based upon that re-
search.
" A problem arises, however, concerning the accountability for CPG mainte-
nance. Certification of a CPG upon issuance is only one step in the legitimization
of the CPG. Equally important is the CPG being continually updated as new evi-
dence is uncovered which bears on the effectiveness of the treatment approach set
forth in the CPG. See Rosoff, supra note 10, at 385.
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Finally, requiring guideline certification would remove
much of the public concern over the credibility of guidelines
developed by organizations, like HMOs and other managed
care companies, which have obvious competing interests. The
medical community would be more likely to respect a practice
that they know has been carefully considered and found ac-
ceptable by various members of their profession. Furthermore,
it is more likely that CPGs would be recognized in a court of
law as the legal standard if it is obvious that the medical pro-
fession has accepted and adopted the CPG as authoritative. 4 '
The certification requirement will likely foster a much needed
sense of trustworthiness and validity in the proffered practice
guidelines.
Megan L. Sheetz
14 See Rosoff, supra note 10, at 380. (finding that "[tihe key to the court's
recognition of the CPG as the legal standard would, in any case, be the medical
profession's acceptance of the CPG as authoritative. Obviously, this acceptance
would depend upon the power and reputation of the body developing, endorsing, or
adopting the CPG."). Currently, the American Medical Association opposes the
adoption of CPGs as a legal standard, preferring instead that CPGs be used only
as evidence of the customarily observed professional standard until the CPGs be-
come widely accepted and relied upon among the medical community. See Rosoff,
supra, note 10, at 383.
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